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A Party Need Not Show Prejudice or Surprise
to Impeach Its Own Witness
In Wilson v. State,' the Supreme Court of Georgia unanimously held
that a party may impeach the credibility of its own witness with that
witness' prior inconsistent statement without showing that the testimony
is a total surprise or affirmatively damaging to the party's case. 2
Bill Ray Wilson was convicted of murder and armed robbery on the
basis of testimony from three prosecution witnesses. His case consisted
solely of his sworn denial.3 The testimony of one prosecution witness was
inconsistent with a previous written, sworn statement in which the witness
had said Wilson had confessed to the murder in his presence several days
after the crime.4 The district attorney, claiming that he had been "entrapped" by the witness' testimony, sought to impeach the witness under
§38-1801 of the Georgia Code by introducing the prior inconsistent statement.' The district attorney admitted knowing that the witness had been
waivering from his original statement but said that he had called the
witness anyway with the hope that he would be faithful to his earlier, more
colorful version of the story. The trial court eventually was persuaded that
the prosecution had been adequately entrapped and allowed the district
attorney to impeach the witness with his earlier contradictory statement."
On appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Wilson enumerated several
errors allegedly made by the lower court, including its allowing the prosecution to impeach its own witness with the prior inconsistent statement.7
1. 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975).
2. Id. at 475, 219 S.E.2d at 760.
3. Id. at 471, 219 S.E.2d at 757.
4. The witness' pre-trial statement contained the following account: "[Wilson] told me
he had taken a boy named James Olin up in some woods and killed him, he said he hit him
in the head with a hammer and then he put a stick in his head . . . He was laughing and
telling all about it." At trial, the witness said Wilson had told him "that someone had got
killed or he had killed somebody. I don't know to be exact." Id. at 471, 219 S.E.2d at 758.
5. GA. CODE ANN. §38-1801 (1974) provides that "[a] party may not impeach a witness
voluntarily called by him, except where he has been entrapped by a previous contradictory
statement."
6. Upon further examination, the witness admitted making the written statement but
said that the facts contained therein had been told to him by someone other than Wilson.
Id. at 417, 219 S.E.2d at 758.
7. The supreme court held it was not error to allow another witness, whose name had not
been furnished to Wilson and who had not been seated in the courtroom after the rule of
sequestration had been invoked, to testify for the prosecution. The court based its ruling on
the fact that the prosecution had discovered the witness only the night before he testified, so
allowing him to testify was proper under GA. CODE ANN. §27-1403 (1972) (witness whose name
is not on defendant's list cannot testify for state unless the evidence is newly-discovered and
not known to state at time of furnishing the defendant its list). Id. at 476, 219 S.E.2d at 760.
See also Mitchell v. State, 226 Ga. 450, 175 S.E.2d 545 (1970).
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The defense argued that the prosecution had been neither surprised nor
damaged by the witness' testimony and thus it was error to allow the
witness to be impeached by the party who called him. Justice Hall, writing
for the supreme court, noted that the Georgia cases had previously required showings of both prejudice and surprise before a party was recognized to be entrapped by its own witness,8 but he said the court would no
longer follow that rule. The court affirmed the trial judge's ruling and said
it would no longer require a party to show surprise or prejudice before it
would be allowed to impeach the credibility of its own witness by use of a
prior inconsistent statement
At common law, a party could not impeach its own witness, but authorities disagree on the origin of the rule. One theory is that it evolved from
the early Roman decisory oath, under which a party could prove a difficult
case by compelling his adversary to prove his claim or defense by making
a statement under oath. Once this was done, the statement could not be
contradicted.'0 A second theory about the origin of the rule is that it developed during the period of transition from the inquisitorial method of trial
to the adversary system in the late 17th century.' One of the most frequently cited theories is that the rule originated in the practice of trial by
compurgation or wager-at-law in medieval England.2 Under this method
of trial, the only witnesses whom a party could offer on his behalf were
"oath-helpers," who would support the party's case by swearing their belief in his version of the story. As such, they were really only character
witnesses, and the party offering them was understandably forbidden from
contradicting them. 2' It was many years after the practice of trial by compurgation ended before a statute was passed in England allowing a party
to impeach the testimony of his witness under certain circumstances."
Several reasons traditionally have been offered for the rule against impeaching one's own witness. One reason commonly given is that the party
guarantees the credibility of his witnesses when he places them on the
stand; having vouched for the witnesses' veracity, the party cannot seek
to discredit them should they prove adverse. 5 Another explanation fre8. 235 Ga. at 472, 219 S.E.2d at 758.
9. Id. at 475, 219 S.E.2d at 760.
10. See Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 220, 202 P. 1099, 1100-01 (1922).
11. See Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. CHI. L.
REV. 69 (1936).
12. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §896 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WIGcMORE); Comment, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REV. 996 (1963).
13. WIGNMORE, supra note 12, at §896.
14. This early statute reads: "A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach
his credit by general evidence of bad character, but he may, in case the witness shall in the
opinion of the judge prove adverse, contradict him by other evidence, or by leave of the judge
prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony."
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, §22.
15. Murray v. New York R. R., 332 Mich. 159, 50 N.W.2d 748 (1952).
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quently advanced is that a party should not be able to use the threat of
impeachment as a tool to coerce favorable testimony from a witness." If a
party could hold such a threat of impeachment over the head of his anxious
witness, he might be able to blackmail him into testifying favorably, even
to the point of perjury.' 7
In the United States, the rule against impeaching one's own witness is
applied with varying degrees of severity, depending on the jurisdiction."
In a number of jurisdictions, the rule has been modified by statute or
decision to allow impeachment of one's own witness when the party has
been prejudiced and surprised by his testimony. 9 Moreover, the recently
adopted Federal Rules of Evidence have done away with the rule entirely
and allow unrestricted impeachment of a witness by any party. 0
The Georgia statute on impeachment of a party's own witness requires
that the party show the court that he has been entrapped by the witness'
testimony because of a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness.,'
McDaniel v. State,22 laying down a two-pronged test, was one of the first
cases to hold that "entrapment" meant that the party must have been
surprised and damaged (or prejudiced) by the testimony.2 The supreme
court held that since the solicitor had not talked to the witness before trial,
he could not have been entrapped by any prior inconsistent statement.2 4
Later decisions further restricted the operation of Georgia Code §38-1801.
In Jeens v. Wrightsville & Tennille R. R. ,5 the court held that the defen16. Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principlesand Modern Trends, 34
IND. L. J. 1 (1958).
17. 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §607(01) (1975).
18. See 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE §26:12 (6th ed. 1972) for a comparison of the different
approaches various jurisdictions in the United States take in dealing with the rule.
19. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §38 at 76 (2d ed. 1972).
20. FED. R. Ev. 607 states: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party,
including the party calling him." The Advisory Committee's comment following the rule
states: "The substantial inroads into the old rule made over years by decisions, rules, and
statutes are evidence of the doubts as to its basic soundness and workability." 56 F.R.D. 183,
267 (1975).
21. GA. CODE ANN. §38-1801 (1974). The statute appeared in the original state code; see
GA. CODE OF 1861 §3793. Even before this statute was adopted, it was held that a party could
attack the testimony, if not the general credibility, of his witness if he was entrapped by a
previous contradictory statement: "A party is not to be sacrificed by his witness; and he ought
not to be entrapped by the arts of a designing man, perhaps in the interest of his adversary.
He ought, therefore, to be permitted to relieve himself from the effect of testimony which has
taken him by surprise, not by showing that the witness, from his general character for truth,
is not entitled to credit, but by showing that the fact is different." Burkhalter v. Edwards,
16 Ga. 593 (1855).
22. 53 Ga. 254 (1874).
23. "It is not sufficient that [the witness] shall have made contradictory statements;
such statements must have deceived, and led the party complaining to introduce him, and
thus, unwittingly, to have been damaged by statements different from what he expected."
Id. at 255.
24. Id. at 254-55.
25. 144 Ga. 48, 85 S.E. 1055 (1915).
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dant could not rely on contradictory testimony of a witness given in another trial as the basis for impeachment.26 The court said that the party
or his counsel should have exercised "the least diligence" and interrogated
the witness personally as to his knowledge of the transaction before offering
him to testify. 27 In apparent agreement with Jeens is the court of appeals
decision in Smith v. State, 28 where it was held that the solicitor-general
could not impeach a witness called by him on the basis of the witness' prior
inconsistent statement because the statement was not made directly to the
solicitor-general or to a third person to be conveyed to the solicitorgeneral. 9 The supreme court later rejected this requirement in Sparks v.
State,30 holding that "when a written statement has been given to one who
has authority in law to make criminal investigations for the State, the
solicitor-general may rely upon it as fully as if it had been made directly
to him."'" In addition to these restrictions, the Georgia courts have made
it clear that the prior inconsistent statement may not be used as substantive evidence 2 or as evidence of general bad character of the witness 3 and
that even if the party is entrapped, it cannot introduce the statement for
impeachment purposes if the witness avails himself of the Fifth Amend3
ment.
In Wilson v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had shown "adequate" surprise to satisfy the first prong of the test
of entrapment.3 5 Dispensing with this question in a single paragraph, the
court noted that while the witness had been "backing up" on the details
of his story to the district attorney, he had never actually repudiated his
allegation that Wilson had confessed to the crime.3 The court did not
further elaborate on the issue but simply 3 said it was satisfied that the
prosecution had been adequately surprised. 1
The supreme court found more difficult the question whether there was
sufficient prejudice to satisfy the entrapment requirement. The court said
on that point decisions in the state were in conflict.38 On the one hand were
cases requiring that the witness' testimony do more than simply fail to
support the party's case; the testimony had to affirmatively damage it.3 9
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 52, 85 S.E. at 1056.
Id. at 52, 85 S.E. at 1056.
74 Ga. App. 685, 41 S.E.2d 179 (1947).
Id. at 686, 41 S.E.2d at 180.
209 Ga. 250, 71 S.E.2d at 608 (1952).
Id. at 251, 71 S.E.2d at 609.
Rogers v. Saye, 106 Ga. App. 453, 127 S.E.2d 161 (1962).
Kitchens v. Hall, 116 Ga. App. 41, 156 S.E.2d 920 (1967).
Jenkins v. State, 73 Ga. App. 515, 37 S.E.2d 230 (1946).
235 Ga. at 473, 219 S.E.2d at 759.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 473-74, 219 S.E.2d at 759-60.
Id. at 473, 219 S.E.2d at 759. See, e.g., Rickerson v. State, 106 Ga. 391, 33 S.E. 639
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There was agreement that Wilson fell into this category, but the court
chose to follow another line of cases that allowed impeachment even when
the testimony was not affirmatively damaging but merely inconsistent. 0
In support of its decision, the court in Wilson pointed to the "palpable
falseness" of the rationale for the rule against impeaching one's own witness." The court agreed with Wigmore'2 that the reasons usually given for
the rule do not justify its continuance: 3 (1) that a party should be morally
bound by the statements of his witness (2) that a party guarantees the
credibility of his witness and (3) that a party should not be allowed to hold
the threat of impeachment over a witness." The court saw no validity in
the first two reasons, stating that it is illogical to hold a party as guarantor
of his witnesses, when he usually has no choice over whom they will be but
rather is stuck with the ones he has. Only the third reason was credited as
being of any substance. The court then noted the approach of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and, while not expressly adopting that view, concluded
"that the ends of justice are far better served by full exposure of whatever
previous statements a witness might have made if his testimony conflicts
with them." 5 Summarizing, the court stated: "Henceforth, for
'entrapment' under that [sic] Code Ann. §38-1801 to exist, we will not
require that the witness' testimony be a total 'surprise' nor that it be
6
affirmatively damaging.'
It is possible that the statement from the supreme court's opinion in
Wilson could be narrowly construed by some trial judges because of the
qualifiers "total surprise" and "affirmatively damaging." By using this
dangerous qualifying language, the court may have left room for some
semantic jousting over the question of when a surprise is "total" or when
damage is "affirmative." However, this debate could only occur if those
words were taken out of the context of the court's opinion. Reading the
opinion as a whole, it is apparent that the supreme court has completely
rejected the old rule requiring prejudice or surprise before a party may
impeach its own witness. By choosing to follow the line of cases allowing
impeachment whenever a statement is inconsistent and by citing Federal
Rule of Evidence 607 with obvious approval, the supreme court made it
clear that the old requirements for entrapment have been laid to rest.
(1898): "The mere failure of a witness to testify to facts supposed to be beneficial to the party
introducing him and which were expected to be proved by him does not come within the
reason or policy of the rule [allowing impeachment]." Id. at 392, 33 S.E. at 640.
40. 235 Ga. at 474, 219 S.E.2d at 759. See, e.g., Wisdom v. State, 234 Ga. 650, 217 S.E.2d
244 (1975); Young v. State, 220 Ga. 75, 137 S.E.2d 34 (1964).
41. 235 Ga. at 474, 219 S.E.2d at 759.
42. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, at §896 et seq.
43. 235 Ga. at 475, 219 S.E.2d at 760.
44. Id. at 474-75, 219 S.E.2d at 760.
45. Id. at 475, 219 S.E.2d at 760.
46. Id.
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The holding in Wilson should be applauded by all trial lawyers. It means
that the lawyer and his client will no longer be at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness or adversary. There are those who may say that such a
holding risks confusing the trier of fact by offering for impeachment purposes evidence that might be viewed as substantive evidence by jurors. Of
course, that confusion can be remedied by careful jury instructions from
the trial judge. The best response to this type of criticism is in the Wilson
opinion: "Should anyone object that the introduction of earlier out-ofcourt statements could occasion confusion, we answer that it is the function of a thorough and sifting cross-examination to explore the circumstan4' 7
ces of each witness' pronouncements, in the ultimate quest for truth.
ROBERT
47.

Id. at 476, 219 S.E.2d at 760.
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